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Links between politicians and firms are prevalent across the world. Faccio (2006), for example, documents political connections in over 74 percent of 
the countries in her sample.1 Economists have suggested two potential conse-
quences of these links. First, firms may benefit from political connections, for 
example, through politically channeled loans and contracts, regulatory benefits, 
and soft budget constraints. A multitude of evidence supports this contention.2 
Second, politicians may extract benefits from firms. For example, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) predict  theoretically that firms expand employment to garner votes 
1 Specific examples from individual studies abound. Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that 23 percent of firms that 
received corporate loans in Pakistan had a politician sitting on their board. Fisman (2001) finds that 38 percent of 
firms on the Jakarta stock exchange were closely connected to President Suharto. Faccio (2006) finds that 87 per-
cent of market capitalization in Russia is in politically connected firms.
2 A long tradition in economics starting with Stigler (1971) examines regulatory capture by politicians. Recent 
empirical evidence on the different channels is provided by Fisman (2001); Khwaja and Mian (2005); Dinc (2005); 
Jayachandran (2006); Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006); Faccio (2010).
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alternative mechanism through which politicians may benefit elector-
ally from connected firms, examining sugar mills in India. I find evi-
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years, reflected in lower prices paid to farmers for cane. This result 
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for  connected politicians; and Bertrand et al. (2006), Cole (2009), and Dinc (2005) 
explore this channel empirically.
This paper explores an alternative mechanism through which politicians may 
benefit from connected firms, namely by extracting resources for political cam-
paigns. Focusing on sugar mills in Maharashtra, India, I investigate how mill 
outcomes are affected by mill chairmen (chief executives elected by farmer-share-
holders) seeking external political office. In particular, I test whether electoral 
cycles in input prices paid for sugarcane are concentrated in politically con-
trolled mills. The analysis thus also relates directly to the literature on politi-
cal cycles— economic activity that is correlated with election cycles (Alesina and 
Roubini 1997; Shi and Svensson 2003).
The context of sugar mills offers several attractive features. First, political con-
nections are widespread and identifiable. Of 183 mills for which data are available, 
101 had current chairmen who competed for state or national elections between 
1993–2005. Second, almost all mills are grower cooperatives, and, hence, profits/
losses are distributed to farmer-shareholders via input prices paid for sugarcane. 
Finally, the simple technology of sugar production makes it possible to empirically 
separate whether distortions in profits stem from changes in productivity or from 
simple theft. The empirical analysis relies on a hand-constructed panel dataset, 
which identifies politically controlled mills by matching mill chairmen names to 
those of electoral candidates, thus allowing a comparison of election-year outcomes 
in politically controlled and nonpolitically controlled mills.
I find that cane prices that each mill pays its farmers fall in politically controlled 
mills in election years. The price drops are significant from the farmer’s perspec-
tive, representing about 20 percent of annual variation in a typical mill’s prices, and 
translate to economically significant plunges in revenues of around Rs 6 million 
($135,000) per election year, per mill. The drops are robust to specifying prices in 
logs rather than levels and to dropping particular elections where treatment effects 
may not be expected, and may be higher in magnitude during close elections (this 
result is not significant in all specifications). A variety of results suggests that these 
drops are not (at least entirely) due to a loss of productivity stemming from election-
related interference in mill functioning, although a conclusive case cannot be made.
I argue that drops in price represent mill funds siphoned off to finance politicians’ 
electoral campaigns, an argument that reinforces previous claims of price distor-
tions. Sridharan (1999) suggests that campaign funds in India are regularly raised 
by “manipulation of administered prices on commodities like sugarcane.” Banerjee 
et al. (2001) show that suppression of cane prices is a mechanism for extracting 
rents from sugar mills in Maharashtra. My evidence suggests that this mechanism is 
particularly relevant in election years. In developing countries with low official cam-
paign finance limits and imperfect oversight, illicit campaign financing and spend-
ing is of much higher magnitude and importance than legal flows (Gingerich 2010). 
In the sugar mills case, the magnitude of the drops in revenue is roughly comparable 
to the funds required to contest elections according to a number of sources (Ganesan 
1997; Aiyar 2000; Sridharan 2006).
These results complement the literature on political connections, which empha-
sizes benefits rather than costs to connected firms. In addition, the previous 
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literature on political cycles has focused on short-term gifts rather than taxes on 
voters in election years, or how election campaign funds are spent rather than 
raised.3 Theories of tactical redistribution suggest that politicians will target 
resources to maximize their electoral success (Wright 1974; Dixit and Londregan 
1996; Grossman and Helpman 1996; Snyder 1989). Cole (2009) and Dahlberg 
and Johansson (2002), for example, find that incumbent governments allocate 
finances to constituencies with close elections and swing voters. This theory and 
supporting evidence suggest that the Shleifer and Vishny (1993) prediction that 
politicians pressure firms to expand employment will hold under certain condi-
tions; namely, that a dollar spent on the firm’s employee increases the probability 
that she votes for the politician more than a dollar spent on someone else. Under 
different conditions, however, the optimal campaign strategy might involve tax-
ing the firm and redistributing toward other voters if the employees’ elasticity of 
voting with respect to transfers is relatively low, and/or the employees comprise a 
small, yet rich, proportion of the voting population.
Further examination reveals that both these conditions might be true in the con-
text of sugarcane farmers in Maharashtra. Sugarcane farmers are relatively rich 
compared to the average voter in rural areas (Mullainathan and Sukhtankar 2011), 
and also comprise a small proportion of the voting population in national election 
constituencies.4 Farmers may also be constrained by the institutional arrangement, 
since they cannot sell sugarcane to mills far away, and government interference 
in sugar markets means they enjoy rents that preclude them from shifting to other 
crops. This account, however, does not explain why farmers continue electing these 
politicians to chair their mills. Most observers acknowledge that internal mill elec-
tions are keenly contested, and chairmen who pay low cane prices are likely to be 
punished (Attwood 1992; Baviskar 1980). Why then might sugarcane farmers’ votes 
be inelastic with respect to low prices in election years? One possible explanation 
is that politicians channel funds back to mills once they get elected. I examine mill 
payments of cane prices when chairmen succeed in elections and find that chairmen 
who win national elections pay farmers higher cane prices in the year after elec-
tions.5 When the chairman’s political party controls the state government, the mill 
also pays higher cane prices. While these results are merely suggestive, perhaps, 
from the farmer’s perspective, price drops are not theft by politicians, but indirect 
campaign contributions for which they receive compensation later.
While a large and long standing body of literature studies benefits to firms from 
political connections, economists have only recently turned their attention to the 
rents that politicians may extract from firms. Most analyses of political connections 
have relied on event studies to show the benefits of political connections. This paper 
suggests that a longer time horizon may be necessary to capture the costs associ-
ated with periods when politicians require financing for their own aims. Analyses of 
political cycles have generally focused on incumbent politicians who have access to 
3 A notable exception is a recent working paper by Kapur and Vaishnav (2011), which finds drops in cement 
consumption just prior to election months, and argues that the drops are a result of construction company contribu-
tions to election campaigns.
4 In addition, the poor in India are more likely to vote than the rich (Yadav 2002; Mitra and Singh 1999).
5 Note that this is not merely a bounce back to average prices, but to higher than average prices.
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government-controlled policy instruments, such as fiscal policy, grants from central 
to state governments, or credit policy. My study, in contrast, documents political 
cycles caused by politicians and mechanisms outside government. A separate litera-
ture on political redistribution examines conditions under which politicians reward 
their supporters (patronage) or woo swing voters (strategic allocation) (Wright 
1974; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Grossman and Helpman 1996). My evidence sug-
gests that politicians extract rents from their supporters during elections, but perhaps 
reward these supporters after winning elections. Finally, the paper adds to a small 
but growing literature on illicit campaign finance, empirical studies on which are 
limited because of the difficulties in obtaining data (Gingerich 2010; Kapur and 
Vaishnav 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background on 
sugar mills and politics in Maharashtra, and explains the sugar production process. 
Section II describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section III presents the results 
and robustness checks. Section IV interprets these results and presents empirical tests 
and results on whether politicians pay back farmers. Section V concludes.
I. Sugar and Politics in Maharashtra
Sugar production is an extremely important sector in Maharashtra, with 45 per-
cent of the state’s rural population dependant on the sector for their livelihood.6 
Sugarcane is the primary cash crop in the state, taking up 24 percent of all irri-
gated land (Agricultural Census of India 2001). The vast majority of sugar mills 
in Maharashtra are grower cooperatives. Political control has been a characteristic 
feature since the first cooperative sugar mill in the state was established in the 1950s. 
I describe the industry structure in greater detail below.
A. The sugar Industry and cooperatives
There are currently 185 sugar mills in operation in Maharashtra, of which over 90 
percent are cooperatives.7 In a cooperative mill, farmers obtain shares proportional 
to the amount of land they own. A share entitles a farmer to sell a specified amount 
of cane to the mill, and obliges the mill to buy that amount of cane. The price paid 
to farmers for supplying the cane is a direct indicator of mill profits and losses, as all 
residual claims are adjusted using the final price paid per ton of cane.
State and national governments heavily regulate the sugar industry. Public funds 
are used to set up mills, provide bailouts when mills face threats of bankruptcy and 
provide subsidized loans for operation. Sugar mills have monopsony power under 
the “command area” or zoning system, whereby farmers who have land in a particu-
lar area can only sell cane to the assigned mill in that region, and the mill can only 
6 Source for dependent population figure: http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/chiefminister/cm_cooperative_
sugar_factories.pdf.
7 The few private mills are similar to cooperatives, and there is no reason to presume that they are free of 
political pressures or connections. For example, Lokmangal Agro Industries, a private mill in Solapur district, is 
controlled by Subhash Deshmukh, the current member of Parliament from North Solapur.
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buy cane from the farmers in its command area.8 Cane price floors are set by state 
and national governments. These usually do not bind in Maharashtra.
A typical cooperative consists of about 20,000 farmer-shareholders. The conven-
tional governance structure of a cooperative consists of a chairman, vice-chairman, 
secretary, treasurer, and a board of directors, all of whom are elected every four or 
five years.9 In these elections, each shareholder is entitled to a single vote, regardless 
of the number of shares she owns. Cooperative elections allow politicians to gain 
control over the mill. On the other hand, these internal elections might also be a con-
straint on rent extraction, since most observers agree that elections for the executive 
positions are intensely contested (Attwood 1992; Baviskar 1980). The price of cane 
paid is a very important factor in these elections. Attwood (1992, 200) remarks:
The primary economic goal of the directors is to pay the highest possible 
cane price to the growers. cooperative chairmen and directors also have 
strong political goals. They use their local influence to compete in state 
politics, and many have become members of the Legislative Assembly (mLAs) or members of Parliament (mPs). consequently, there is keen 
competition for election to the factory boards. In these elections, the direc-
tors are judged, among other things, by how well the members have been 
paid for their sugarcane.
B. Politicians, Elections, and control of sugar mills
Political control of sugar mills is widespread in Maharashtra. For example, the pre-
vious two Chief Ministers of Maharashtra, the current Agriculture Minister of India, 
and even the President of India all directly or indirectly (through a family member or 
close relative) control a sugar mill in the state. In my data, in a typical election year 
almost half of state and national constituencies that contain sugar mills have at least 
one contesting candidate who is a current chairman of a sugar mill (Figure 1). These 
chairman-candidates are the basis of my definition of political control. I consider mills 
as being under political control when the current chairman is a politician, i.e., someone 
who has ever been a candidate in state or national elections over the sample period.
Chairman-candidates fall into two groups: large farmers and landlords who work 
their way up the mill hierarchy and enter politics as a consequence, and existing politi-
cians who enter mill politics.10 In order to contest elections, candidates usually need a 
ticket from a major party, although they can always contest as independents. Getting 
a party ticket can itself be very costly. While there are no internal primaries, lobbying 
for and often directly purchasing a major party ticket requires funds. The vast majority 
8 Although this system was supposedly dismantled in 1997, the new system does not allow new mills to open 
within a 15 km radius of an existing mill, which, when combined with the dependent relationship a cane farmer 
has with the mill to procure seed, fertilizer, credit, pesticide, etc., effectively binds the farmer to the existing mill. 
Such measures were meant to ensure that mills utilized their capacity, and to ensure that sugarcane could be crushed 
within 24 hours of it being cut, as it quickly loses its juice.
9 Mechanisms for electing chairmen differ across mills. Some are elected directly, while others are chosen by 
the board from among its members. Moreover, some mills have rotating positions on the board every two years, 
whereas others even elect their chairmen every year.
10 The citizen-candidate model of electoral politics (Besley and Coate 1997) seems to describe the process of 
political entry in both cases.
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of candidates contest on a major party ticket, with the Congress and the Nationalist 
Congress Party (NCP) being the parties with affiliations to most sugar mills, although 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has also made some inroads in recent years.
Winning candidates in state constituencies are elected to the Maharashtra State 
Legislative Assembly, while winners in national constituencies serve in the National 
Parliament. The Indian Constitution mandates that elections to both state and national 
assemblies be held every five years. In practice, however, elections may be called 
early when a coalition government cannot maintain its majority. As a consequence, 
state and national elections are not necessarily concurrent. Once elected, legislators 
can access state resources via both licit and illicit means. By all accounts, politicians 
add to their personal wealth after winning elections (Ramesh 2008). However, con-
testing elections is costly. Funds are required for campaigning, bringing rural voters 
to the polls, and sometimes direct vote-buying.
The effects of political control of mills have been debated. Bunsha (2003) sug-
gests “56 of Maharashtra’s 163 sugar mills are bankrupt, ruined by corruption and 
nepotism. Second- and third-generation politicians have squeezed out all prof-
its, leaving the state government to bail them out.” In recent years, a number of 
bankrupt cooperatives have been taken over by private firms. On the other hand, 
Attwood (1992) writes positively about the performance of sugarcane cooperatives 
in the state, comparing them favorably to private mills in the state of Uttar Pradesh. 
Proponents often point to the example of Baramati, a dormant backwater cane grow-
ing region that now has a vibrant economy thanks to the patronage of the premier 
sugar mill politician and Union Agricultural Minister Sharad Pawar. These divergent 
views suggest that political connections of sugar mills can result in both costs and 
benefits to farmer-shareholders.











1994–1995 1995–1996 1997–1998 1998–1999 2003–2004
State National
Figure 1. Proportion of Constituencies with Chairman Contesting External Elections
notes: Plots the proportion of constituencies with sugar mills that witnessed a mill chairmen 
contest state or national elections during the period 1993–2005. There are 120 state constituen-
cies and 33 national constituencies that contain sugar mills in Maharashtra.
VoL. 4 no. 3 49sukhTAnkAr: PoLITIcAL connEcTIons And sugAr mILLs In IndIA
C. sugar Production Function
Sugar production is a two-stage process. The first stage consists of planting and 
growing sugarcane, and harvesting and transporting it to the factory. Sugarcane 
is a water- and fertilizer-intensive crop that is harvested yearly. Once harvested, 
the stalk can regrow for another one to three harvests. The second stage involves 
extracting sugar from the cane at the factory. The harvested cane is crushed to 
extract sucrose-rich juice, which is boiled and refined using lime and sulphur to 
produce sugar crystals. The crushing season usually runs from November through 
April/May.
The sucrose and water content of sugarcane determines the potential amount 
of sugar that can be extracted from it, although a role is played by the efficiency 
and organization of the mill. Once cane is harvested, it must be crushed within 24 
hours to prevent drying. Mills need to coordinate cane harvesting in order to run 
the factory at capacity every day. Machinery breakdowns are extremely costly, 
since the cane at the factory starts drying out, and the harvesting schedule must 
be adjusted.
The firm faces a capacity constraint in the maximum tonnage of cane that can 
be crushed per day using the installed machinery, as well as a constraint on the 
 maximum amount of sugar that can be extracted from a given amount of cane. 
Output of sugar is roughly constant returns to scale in most inputs, and clearly linear 
in cane crushed.
D. mill revenues and cane Prices
The chief source of revenue for mills is the sale of sugar. Mills can sell up to 90 
percent of output on the open market. The rest must be sold to the government at 
reduced rates. Each mill pays its farmers a single price per metric ton of cane every 
year based on weight; i.e., mills cannot price discriminate on the basis of quality. 
Each farmer must be paid the same price per ton of cane. Sugarcane cooperatives are 
not legally allowed to retain profits, although they can accrue losses. Any excess of 
revenues over costs must be returned to farmers as higher prices for cane or invested 
in “public goods,” such as schools and universities for farmers’ children, roads, 
or irrigation networks. Hence, cane prices are generally good indicators for profits 
made by the mill, as also emphasized in Banerjee et al. (2001).
The recovery rate, sugar produced per unit cane, determines the overall revenues 
of the mill, while the cane price designates the division of revenues between farmers 
and mill cost and upkeep.11 Recovery rates are strongly and positively correlated 
with prices. A drop in the recovery rate, hence, reduces the overall revenues avail-
able to pay cane prices, but does not necessarily mean that cane prices will go down, 
since mill leaders could defer or default on other costs, such as to transporters, inter-
est costs, mill upkeep costs, etc.
11 In this paper, all I observe are reported recovery rates.
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II. Data and Empirical Strategy
A. data
My analysis relies on a hand-constructed panel dataset consisting of: annual data 
on individual mill outcomes, inputs, and operations; annual data on state, national, 
and world sugar industry indicators; monthly rainfall; state and national election dates, 
candidates, and results; mill chairman names; and satellite images of sugar-growing 
regions. All data refer to the cane crushing season, that is November–May. For exam-
ple, the year 1993 refers to the crushing season 1993–1994. All observations are at the 
level of a mill-year, given the yearly harvest of sugarcane. Since not all mills were in 
existence or operation in all years, the panel is unbalanced.12 While data for most mill 
outcomes are available from 1969–2005, mill chairmen’s names are available system-
atically only from 1993.13 The online Appendix describes the data and sources in detail.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics separately for politically connected and 
nonconnected mills. The first year that a cooperative operates is usually a “trial” 
year, when a very small quantity of cane is crushed and very low recovery rates 
are achieved. These years, data for which are only available for some mills, are 
excluded from regressions and the summary statistics. I also exclude “nonstarter” 
seasons, during which the mill is open for only a few days and almost no cane is 
crushed. These represent a clear discontinuity from the rest of the data. The data 
show that politically connected mills and those that are not politically connected are 
exactly alike on the recovery rate and cane price dimensions. The major difference 
between the two groups is that politically connected mills tend to be larger (average 
capacity of 2,629 tons crushed per day versus 2,139).
B. Empirical strategy
Anecdotal evidence suggests that chairmen who are candidates in external elec-
tions use mill resources for contesting elections.14 In order to examine the effects 
of direct connections between politicians and mills, I match mill chairmen’s names 
to those of electoral candidates to identify chairmen who are politicians. To reduce 
errors in matching, I use only exact matches and consider electoral candidates only 
in and around the constituency that the sugar mill is located. I consider mills as 
being under political control when the current chairman is a politician, i.e., someone 
who has ever been a candidate in state or national elections over the sample period.
12 Biases, if any, are more likely to arise from incidental truncation—some mills do not work or report their 
data in some years—as opposed to pure attrition, since very few mills shut down completely. I test whether the 
operational status itself is affected by political connections in order to determine whether the unbalanced nature of 
the panel biases the results.
13 The National Federation of Cooperative Sugar Factories Yearbook started reporting mill chairmen’s names 
from that year. In addition, there are 12 mills, mostly private, for whom no mill chairmen’s names are available at 
any time. I drop these from my analysis.
14 For example, Sirsikar (1995) says, “Every sugar cooperative factory has become the centre of rural economic 
and political power. The resources of the factory have also been used for welfare functions … but their main use is 
for securing political power.”
VoL. 4 no. 3 51sukhTAnkAr: PoLITIcAL connEcTIons And sugAr mILLs In IndIA
These narrow definitions do not include individuals running for elections who are 
not current chairmen but may still have strong connections to the mill, for example, 
through a relative or protegee, or executives who are in less powerful positions in 
the mill. However, this is the most objective way of considering political control 
given the constraints of the available data. A systematic analysis of candidates with 
indirect, albeit close, links with sugar mills would be difficult, since the  connections 
do not necessarily involve the same family names.15 My definitions of “politician” 
15 Sirsikar (1995), who conducted this analysis in 1995, found that over 80 members of the Maharashtra 
Legislative State were associated with sugar mills from about 120 constituencies with sugar mills. Compared to this 
figure, my measure is a more conservative count of political connections.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Average Not connected Connected p-value Units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cane price 929 929 929 0.996 2004 Rupees
(265) (270) 262)
Recovery rate 10.96 10.96 10.96 0.969 %
(0.97) (1.03) (0.92)
Cane crushed 379,605 342,074 406,044 0.083 Metric tons
(246,800) (234,100) (252,172)
Sugar produced 427,511 387,583 455,639 0.136 Quintals
(297,541) (288,674) (300,635)
Cane planted 0.244 0.251 0.238 0.592 % available cropland
(0.232)  (0.247) (0.22)
Actual days worked 139 135 141 0.137 days
(50.48) (50.3) (50.46)
Actual hours worked 3,038 2,953 3,098 0.127 hours
(1,111) (1,102) (1,114)
Hours lost to breakdowns 3.26 3.25 3.27 0.959 % of available hours
(3.6) (3.8) (3.45)
Hours lost to cane shortage 8.58 9.24 8.12 0.349 % of available hours
(11.96) (12.16) (11.81)
Lime added 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.975 Kilograms/ton cane
(0.037) (0.035) (0.038)
Sulphur added 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.252 Kilograms/ton cane
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Capacity 2,416 2,139 2,629 0.002  Tons crushed/day
(1,092) (924) (1,163)
Mill closed 0.142 0.160 0.128 0.333
(0.349)  (0.367) (0.334)
notes: The summary statistics do not include years that were “trial years,” as these are also excluded from the analysis. 
Not all mills are in operation in all years. Hence, there are some data missing. There are 185 mills currently reported to 
exist in Maharashtra according to the Maharashtra State Sugar Cooperatives Federation. Of those mills, a maximum of 
176 mills were in operation in 2002. The paper uses data on 195 current and old mills. “Cane price” is the annual price 
paid per ton of cane, deflated using the Consumer Price Index for agricultural workers in Maharashtra. “Recovery rate” 
is the total amount of “sugar produced” divided by the total weight of “cane crushed,” times 100. “Cane planted” is the 
proportion of available crop land within a 15 km radius of the mill that has been planted with sugarcane. “Actual days 
(hours) worked” are the number of days (hours) that the mill actually operated that season. The “hours lost” variables 
refer to the percentage of working hours that the mill shut down due to machinery breakdowns or cane shortages during 
the time it was open in the season. “Lime added” and “sulphur added” are the amounts added to extracted juice in kilo-
grams/ton. “Mill not in operation” is simply an indicator for whether the mill worked in the current season. Column 4 
presents the p-value from a regression of the variable on an indicator for whether the mill is politically connected (with 
standard errors clustered by mill).
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and “political control” are, hence, conservative. Any potential misclassification that 
is a result of these strict definitions would only attenuate results toward zero, despite 
the nonclassical measurement error (Aigner 1973).
Given these definitions, I can test whether politically controlled mills are par-
ticularly affected in election years during the period 1993–2005. “Election year” 
for this paper corresponds to the sugar year (Nov–Oct) during which election took 
place.16 My strategy is to interact an indicator for political control (which varies 
both over time and across mills) with indicators for election years, while control-
ling for  time-invariant, unobserved differences between mills via mill fixed effects 
δ m , and for unobserved yearly shocks using year fixed effects  τ t . This difference-in-
differences approach allows me to estimate
(1)  y mt = α + νP  c mt + β(P c mt × Ele c t ) +  X mt ′ γ +  δ m +  τ t +  ϵ mt ,
where m indexes mills; t indexes years;  y mt is a mill outcome, such as the recovery 
rate or the cane price; P c mt is an indicator for current mill chairman being a politi-
cian; and  X m t is a set of mill-level controls, such as rainfall, the squared deviation 
from mean rainfall, capacity,17 and—in certain specifications—mill-specific out-
comes, such as hours lost due to machinery breakdowns and cane shortages control 
for idiosyncratic shocks at the mill-year level that might affect outcomes. Since 
elections occur at the same time across mills, standard errors may be spatially corre-
lated. I cluster by year × region, resulting in 39 clusters.18 Errors may also be corre-
lated within mills across years. Accordingly, standard errors are clustered along two 
dimensions, across time-region and mills, using the multi-way clustering approach 
suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) and Thompson (2011).
Finally, it is possible that effects are particularly strong during close election 
years (close election is defined as one where the winning margin was less than 5 per-
cent of cast votes). To test this hypothesis, I first estimate
(2)  y mt = α + νP c mt + ω closeEle c mt + β(P c mt × closeEle c mt ) +  X mt ′ γ
 +  δ m +  τ t +  ϵ mt .
16 National elections took place in May 1996 (sugar year 1995–1996), February 1998 (1997–1998), September–
October 1999 (1998–1999), and April–May 2004 (2003–2004). State elections took place in March 1995 (1994–
1995), September 1999 (1998–1999), and October 2004 (2003–2004). Since there is only one state election that 
took place in a year that did not also have a national election, I do not show separate results for state elections.
17 Capacity changes are infrequent, take a long time to implement, and outside the realm of what an individual 
chairman could achieve in one year, hence, not considered endogenous in this context. A regression of capacity as 
the outcome in equation (1) shows no effect on the political chairman × election year interaction.
18 Maharashtra is twice the size of Germany in terms of land area, and has three major sugarcane growing 
regions distinct in terms of climate and administration: the South region comprising Kolhapur, Sangli, and Satara 
districts; the Central region comprising Ahmednagar, Nashik, Pune, and Solapur districts; and the North-East region 
comprising districts under the administrative divisions of Amravati and Nagpur (there is little to no sugarcane 
grown in the coastal Western region). The South is fertile. The Central region is well-developed and irrigated, while 
the North-East is dry and vast. The Maharashtra Cooperative Sugar Mills Federation uses these regions to aggregate 
up data in its reports.
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To separate out the effects of close elections from other elections, I then estimate
(3)   y mt = α + νP c mt + ωcloseEle c mt +  β 1 (P c mt × closeEle c mt )
 +  β 2 (P c mt × Ele c t ) +  X mt ′ γ +  δ m +  τ t +  ϵ mt .
III. Results
A. The costs of Political connections
Table 2 presents results from equation (1), in which I examine whether more 
politically connected mills face greater pressures, including year-fixed effects to 
control for unobserved year effects. Prices are lower by about Rs 20 a ton in politi-
cally controlled mills during election years, a statistically significant and robust 
result. The results are robust to including rainfall and mill capacity as controls, as 
well as including mill-specific outcomes, such as the recovery rate—sugar produced 
per unit cane, a measure of productivity—and various other mill level shocks, such 
as mill breakdowns and cane shortages. These latter mill-specific outcomes amount 
to over-controlling, but may be important for the discussion (in the next section) on 
the mechanism causing price drops.




(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political chairman 12.96 12.12 13.56 5.054 4.088 3.910 2.111 0.0183
(16.33) (14.00) (11.98) (14.88) (12.81) (15.38) (13.20) (0.0160)
Political chairman × −20.78** −21.11** −19.33** −0.0217**
 election year (8.228) (9.809) (8.266) (0.00936)
Recovery rate 55.59***
(9.090)
Chairman contests national −19.50* −20.37***
 election (10.57) (6.437)
Chairman contests state 0.761 5.474
 election (16.44) (16.83)
Mill fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall, capacity No  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Mill level controls No No Yes No No No No No
Observations 1,151 1,151 1,135 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151
Adj r2 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.88
notes: The table reports coefficients from estimations of equation (1), with the cane price or log cane price as dependent variable, 
and a modified version of equation (1) to consider the case where sitting chairmen actually contest elections. Columns 1–3 and col-
umn 8 present regressions showing interactions with election years, while columns 4–7 present regressions modified to examine the 
case when sitting chairmen actually contest elections. “Political chairman” refers to years in which the mill is chaired by someone 
who was a candidate for state or national elections in the period 1993–2005. “Mill-level controls” include the proportion of hours 
lost due to machinery breakdowns and the proportion of working hours lost due to cane shortages. Standard errors are multi-way 
clustered by year-region as well as by mill.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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As a robustness exercise, I check that cane prices also drop when chairmen are 
actually contesting elections. Columns 4–7 present these results, which hold true 
for national politicians.19 Column 8 shows that specifying the cane price in terms of 
logs rather than levels does not affect the results.20
A potential confound is related to mill closure. Mills might not operate in some 
years if they cannot raise capital for operating expenses, or do not expect sufficient 
cane supply, or if sugar prices are too low for the mill to operate profitably. If poorly 
performing mills are kept open by politicians in election years as a way to garner votes, 
this might explain the observed price drop results.21 To rule out this possibility, I test 
whether mills are more likely to operate in election years. Column 8 in Table 3 sug-
gest that mill closure does not seem to be affected by political control. This assuages 
concerns about the results being driven by the unbalanced nature of the panel.
One might expect election related pressures to be highest during close elections. 
Accordingly, I check whether these election year drops in politically controlled mills 
are particularly large during close elections (defined as elections where the victory 
margin was lower than 5 percent of votes cast). I find that the effect in politically 
controlled mills in years with close elections does seem to be higher, with effect sizes 
of Rs 25 as compared to Rs 21 for all elections (Rs 24 compared to Rs 20 in national 
elections). However, these effects cannot be statistically distinguished from the regu-
lar interaction effect due to large standard errors. (See Table 3).
Is the magnitude of these electoral effects economically significant? The elec-
tion year effects are approximately 2.3 percent of average prices paid. Judged by 
the yearly variation in these outcomes, however, the election year drops assume 
more significance, amounting to about 7–20 percent of the standard deviation. Most 
importantly, these drops can amount to significantly large total Rupee amounts. 
Paying farmers Rs 20 per ton less for their cane amounts to a total of Rs 6 mil-
lion (US $135,000). If indeed these drops represent mechanisms for siphoning off 
mill funds to finance electoral campaigns, the Rupee amounts could represent a 
 significant slice of campaign spending. In the next subsection, I go on to discuss 
whether these drops represent changes in productivity or simply theft.
19 What might account for this difference between state and national elections? The size of constituencies, the 
relative proportion of sugarcane-dependent voters within the electorate, and the competitiveness of elections might 
provide an explanation. A national constituency has about 6 times the electorate of a state constituency (1,375,000 
eligible voters to 230,000 eligible voters in Maharashtra). The electorate in state constituencies that have sugar mills 
is likely to consist of a substantial number of cane farmers, their dependents, or other mill workers, whereas national 
constituencies have many voters not connected to the mill. Assuming 20,000 shareholder farmers per cooperative, 
this would comprise less than 1.5 percent of the national constituency but 9 percent of the state constituency. During 
national elections, money might be siphoned off to woo these other voters—at the cost of lower prices paid to one’s 
supporting farmers. But politicians might not risk this during state elections. Moreover, state elections are far less 
competitive than national elections in sugarcane-growing areas over the study period. The average margin of vic-
tory in national constituencies is 9.6 percent, while the average margin of victory in state constituencies is 12.8 
percent, and a far greater proportion of national elections are decided by a margin of 5 percent or less (40 percent 
to 29 percent).
20 I also separate chairmen into state and national politicians as defined by the last election they contested. Online 
Appendix Table 2 shows that prices drop in election years when national politicians chair the mill, and also when they 
contest elections. Further robustness checks, including adjustments to the functional form, confirm the results.
21 I have already removed the first year of a mill’s operation from the data, as very little output is produced in 
these years, and recovery rates are abnormally low. Therefore, there is no possibility that more mills starting up in 
election years drives these results.
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B. Productivity drop or Embezzlement?
Although chairmen are not involved with the day-to-day running of the mill, it is 
possible that mill operations and inputs are adversely affected during elections. For 
example, mill workers may be deputed to campaigning, and this may lead to lower 
efficiency. Although some of the regressions above control for the recovery rate, it 
is possible that the exact functional form relationship between the cane price and 
recovery rate may not be properly accounted for. Indeed, the recovery rate results 
mirror the cane price results. Mills under political control see a further drop of 0.087 
percentage points in their recovery rates in election years (or 0.8 percent of average 
recovery rates). While these results are not robust to the addition of controls, such as 
rainfall and capacity, the coefficient with additional controls is statistically indistin-
guishable from the original coefficient. (See Table 4)
However, it does not appear as though any other indicators of mill operations or 
inputs are affected by political control. Machinery breakdowns and cane shortages 
are extremely strong predictors of the recovery rate, but they do not differ in election 
years. In fact, the results suggest that, if anything, politically controlled mills operate 
better in election years, as there are fewer hours lost due to machinery breakdowns. 
(Table 4, columns 3–4)22 The main inputs into sugar production are cane, lime, and 
sulphur, yet none of these major inputs are effected by political control. The point 
22 This might account for the fewer hours worked overall. If mills are more efficient in crushing cane, then they 
need to remain open for less time.






operationAny National State 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)
Political chairman 12.31 6.924 5.336 9.467 4.040 3.893 7.381 −0.0281
(14.10) (13.04) (12.99) (12.91) (12.70) (13.25) (12.76) (0.0217)
Close election 2.240 8.535 9.633 2.742 10.57 10.91
(14.45) (12.64) (14.53) (16.48) (18.42) (19.59)
Political chairman −25.37* −12.99 −24.09* −9.971 −15.72 −16.38
 × close election (13.25) (15.24) (14.27) (18.40) (19.93) (20.35)
Political chairman −16.78 −17.33  0.744  −18.15**  −0.00237
 × election year (11.49) (10.65) (12.64) (8.733) (0.0274)
Observations 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,874
Adj r2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.47
notes: The table reports coefficients from estimations of equation (1), (2), and (3), with the cane price and whether the mill is in 
operation as the dependent variable. Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8 present regressions with interactions with any election year, columns 3 
and 4 national elections years only, and columns 5 and 6 state elections only. “Political chairman” refers to years in which the mill 
is chaired by someone who was a candidate for state or national elections during 1993–2005. “Close election” refers to an election 
where the winning margin was less than 5 percent of votes cast. All regressions include mill fixed effects, year fixed effects, as well 
as controls for rainfall. Column 7 recodes 1993–1994 and 1997–1998 as nonelection years since the elections took place in the mid-
dle of the sugar year. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by year-region as well as by mill.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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estimates on cane crushed, for example, correspond to 0.02 standard deviations. 
(Table 4, columns 5–7).23
While cane crushed might be an indicator of cane quality, one can also directly 
examine the amount and quality of cane planted via examining satellite images 
(exact procedure described in the Appendix). Obtaining cloud-free images during 
the correct times (at the start of the crushing season) is difficult, hence, only three 
years of data (2003–2005) have been collected and examined for this project. Thus, 
the results must be seen as illustrative. The data show that the proportion of land 
with high quality cane growing at the start of the harvesting season is no different in 
politically controlled mills in election years (column 8).24
Next, if mill workers and vehicles being used for electoral purposes have adverse 
effects on efficiency, then one might expect that the greatest effects are concentrated 
right at the time of elections, since the major campaign hurdle in rural areas is get-
ting people to the polls. Moreover, the campaign season is usually fairly short, since 
23 There is a mechanical relationship between the amounts of these inputs used and the amount of sugar eventu-
ally produced. A given amount of extracted juice requires a particular amount of lime and sulphur. Significantly 
lower amounts of cane crushed might indicate the existence of unobserved pest- or drought-related shocks that 
could reduce output per unit cane, while significantly higher amounts of cane crushed might reduce output per unit 
cane in case the extra cane crushed is marginal and of lower quality. Lime is added to extracted juice to balance pH 
and clump together impurities, and sulphur is bubbled through the juice to bleach it.
24 The fact that the supply of cane is inelastic to election timing can be explained by institutional and agricultural 
features. First, the command area system explained above means that farmers cannot sell to other mills, and sell-
ing cane for purposes other than sugar production fetches drastically lower prices. Second, sugarcane is harvested 
annually, but it is not planted annually. It regrows from its cut stalk for another two to four years after harvest, and 
it is much more cost effective to grow this “ratoon” crop rather than plant a new crop. In order to adjust supply in 
election years, farmers would have to accurately predict both election years and the duration of their ratoon crop 
at the time of planting, which is extremely difficult. Third, it is not easy to adjust other inputs, such as fertilizer, 
pesticide, or seed quality, that affect yield. All these inputs are actually provided by the mill, which also provides 
agricultural extension officers to monitor cane progress.


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)
Pol. chairman 0.0385 0.0118 119.4 −0.0900 10,250 0.000955  −0.000790 −0.0453
(0.0673) (0.0615) (80.98) (0.237) (14,807) (0.00445) (0.00114) (0.0357)
Pol. chairman −0.0867** −0.0647 −108.5** −0.690*** −399.5 −3.99e-05 0.000430 0.0136
 × election (0.0367) (0.0403) (51.86) (0.262) (9,364) (0.00320) (0.000950) (0.0196)
Mill fixed
  effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed 
 effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall, 
 capacity
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,371 1,406 1,413 1,202 1,205 409
Adj r2 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.51 0.84 0.40 0.52 0.80
notes: The table reports coefficients from estimations of equation (1), with mill inputs and indicators of operations as dependent 
variables. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by year-region as well as by mill.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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candidates receive party nominations only about a month in advance. Consequently, 
elections that take place during the crushing season, when the factory is running, 
would see greater drops in prices and recovery rates, all else equal. In fact, I find that 
elections held when mills are closed see bigger price effects than those held when 
mills are open (online Appendix Table 3).
A final piece of evidence in favor of the hypothesis that funds are appropriated to 
finance electoral campaigns is that the missing amounts correspond well to what is 
generally spent on elections. The section above noted that price drops could account 
for roughly Rs 6 million of missing mill revenues. For comparison, current legal 
limits for spending on campaign finance are Rs 2.5 million in national constituen-
cies and Rs. 1 million in state constituencies, but it is no secret that these limits are 
regularly flouted. While it is difficult to figure out how much money candidates actu-
ally spend on elections, observers have suggested amounts ranging from Rs 1.1 mil-
lion (a figure suggested by Ganesan 1997 when the limit was Rs 450,000) to Rs 10 
million (Aiyar 2000) for national elections.25 The amounts appropriated from mills 
are thus very much in the ballpark of what one would spend to finance an election 
campaign.
IV. Theft or Campaign Contribution?
The fact that politicians tax their own supporters by paying them lower prices 
in election years stands in contrast to the literature on political connections, which 
emphasizes benefits to connected firms. In addition, the literature on political cycles 
generally finds increases in budgetary allocations in election years. Theories of tac-
tical redistribution, however, suggest that politicians will target resources to maxi-
mize their electoral success (Wright 1974; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Grossman 
and Helpman 1996; Snyder 1989). Cole (2009) finds that incumbent governments 
pressure public banks to allocate agricultural credit to constituencies which have 
close elections. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find that grants were allocated to 
constituencies with large numbers of swing voters.
This theory and supporting evidence suggests that politicians maximizing the 
probability of getting elected face an allocation problem with respect to transfers. 
The optimal campaign strategy might indeed involve taxing your own supporters 
and redistributing toward other voters if your supporters’ elasticity of voting with 
respect to transfers is relatively low, and/or they comprise a small yet rich propor-
tion of the voting population.26 The latter contention is most likely true in the Indian 
context. Shareholders of a particular mill would amount to only 1.5 percent of the 
average electorate in a national constituency, while Mullainathan and Sukhtankar 
(2011) find that sugarcane farmers are 33 percent richer than other farmers in Tamil 
Nadu. Moreover, sugarcane farmers may be constrained by the institutional arrange-
ment, since they can only sell their cane to the mill in their command area; and 
25 For comparison, in the 2008 US election, Democrats spent, on average, $1 million per House seat, and $6 
million per Senate seat (www.fec.gov).
26 It is also possible that farmers simply cannot distinguish election year embezzlement and lump it together 
with other types of mismanagement.
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perhaps government control over sugar trade confers rents upon them that preclude 
them from shifting to other crops.
On the other hand, observers suggest that cooperative sugar mills have intensely 
contested internal elections (Attwood 1992). Cane prices paid are an important issue 
in these elections, and chairmen who pay low prices would be subject to electoral 
punishment.27 A possible explanation for why sugarcane farmers’ votes might be 
inelastic to taxes could be that mill chairmen may compensate farmers by channel-
ing funds from state finances after winning elections.
Winning an election gives the chairman access to various sources of government 
funds, which she might choose to channel back to the mill. However, mills whose 
chairmen win elections might be systematically different from those whose chair-
men lose. For this reason, I compare the outcomes of winning and losing mills 
before and after elections. I run the following estimation:
(4)   y mt = α +  β 1 cn  W mt +  β 2 cn L mt +  β 3 cn W m(t−1) +  β 4 cn L m(t−1) 
  +  X mt ′ γ +  δ m +  τ t +  ϵ mt ,
where cn W mt is an indicator for whether the mill chairman won national elections 
this year; cn L mt is an indicator for whether the mill chairman lost national elections 
this year; cn W m(t−1) is an indicator for whether the mill chairman won national 
elections the previous year; and cn L m(t−1) is an indicator for whether the mill 
chairman lost national elections the previous year. This estimation has exactly the 
same set of controls described in equation (1). The outcomes I consider are those 
most important to farmers: cane prices and whether the mill was closed or not.
Another potential source of benefits to mills may be the mill chairman’s political 
party. Even if a mill executive is not contesting external elections, it is possible that 
the mill contributes to political campaigns (see, for example, Baviskar 1980), and 
might receive compensation if the party goes on to form the government. To test this 
channel of benefits, I estimate
(5)  y mt = α +  β 1 Partycente r mt +  β 2 Partystat e mt +  X mt ′ γ +  δ m +  τ t +  ϵ mt ,
where Partystat e mt is an indicator for whether the party affiliated with the mill chair-
man is currently in power at the state level; and Partycente r mt is an indicator for 
whether the party affiliated with the mill chairman is currently in power at the fed-
eral level. This is a powerful test of whether political power actually leads to benefits 
for farmers. Since there are many cases where neighboring mills are affiliated with 
different political parties, this estimation is identified off changes in government.
I separate politically connected mills by whether their chairmen won or lost elec-
tions, and estimate equation (4). Table 5 presents these results. Mills whose chairmen 
won national elections pay substantially higher prices—amounting to Rs 80 per ton 
27 It is possible that if factors, such as ethnicity or village ties, are more important than cane prices, then steal-
ing and low prices would go unpunished in internal elections. However, most cane farmers are ethnic Marathas 
(Attwood 1992; Baviskar 1980).
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more—in the year after elections (column 4).28 Note that this is not simply a bounce 
back to normal prices after the election year drop. Winning mills actually pay higher 
than average prices in the year after elections. Mills whose chairmen lost national 
elections, on the other hand, pay slightly lower than average prices in the year after 
elections. While I cannot reject equality between the coefficients on winning and los-
ing mills during election years, I can indeed reject equality in the year after elections. 
Chairmen who win national elections seem to be able to keep their mills open far more 
successfully than chairmen who lose (column 6).29 These results must necessarily be 
interpreted with caution, since national elections are not separated much by time, and 
politicians winning may depend on the amounts raised previously.
Finally, there is also evidence that farmers are compensated via political parties. I 
find that when the party affiliated with the mill chairman is in power in Maharashtra, 
28 Given that national elections happened in quick succession in the late 1990s, the year 1999 could be consid-
ered both an election year and the year after election. The results are robust to classifying it either way (or both, or 
neither. Basically this year doesn’t drive the results).
29 Anecdotal evidence suggests how politically powerful chairmen are able to keep their mills operating by 
procuring loans from cooperative banks, even though their mills perpetually default on these loans (Mishra 2007). 
Farmers care very much about the mill being open for crushing. Since planting decisions have to be made a year in 
advance, the sudden closing of a mill is extremely costly for farmers. Without a mill to buy their cane, farmers have 
to scramble to find another mill nearby, one that is under no obligation to buy their cane. In the worst circumstances, 
farmers have been known to simply burn their crops rather than accept sharply reduced prices from other mills or 
jaggery producing units (Hardikar 2007).
Table 5—Mill Outcomes in Winning and Losing Mills
Cane price Mill closed
State National State National State National
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
Political chairman × −3.688 −16.63**
 election year (11.71) (8.475)
Political chairman × year after −8.533 9.990
(12.18) (11.15)
Chairman won × election year 16.13 −5.782 0.0162  −0.0943*
(20.30) (16.33)  (0.0247) (0.0558)
Chairman lost × election year −10.55 −17.87 −0.0173 −0.0537
(17.36) (13.39)  (0.0295)  (0.0398)
Chairman won × year after  4.039 79.21* 0.0195 −0.193**
(16.81)  (46.35) (0.0356) (0.0766)
Chairman lost × year after −39.79***  −8.001 −0.0202 −0.0264
(10.97) (24.47) (0.0275) (0.0512)
Mill fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall, capacity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,874 1,874
Adj r2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.47 0.47
notes: The table reports coefficients from estimations of equation (1) with additional interactions for the year after 
elections—(columns 1 and 2), as well as equation (4) (columns 3, 4, 5, 6), with the cane price and an indicator for 
whether the mill is closed as dependent variables. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by year-region as well 
as by mill. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the mill pays Rs 23 more in cane prices (Table 6). Individual state legislators have less 
access to discretionary funds than national legislators, and, hence, may not have the 
ability to compensate farmers themselves after they win elections, but being part of the 
party in power might give them the ability to do so. Moreover, these results are also 
consistent with the fact that politically controlled mills see drops in output and prices 
in election years regardless of whether the individual mill’s chairman is competing in 
external elections. Politically controlled mills may be contributing to party coffers, 
and consequently would expect to benefit when their party wins elections.
There are a number of reasons why politicians might choose to raise money in 
this indirect manner. First, as noted above, legal campaign finance limits in India 
are extremely low. Mills would not be able to make direct contributions of these 
amounts. Second, expropriating from mill funds solves the collective action problem 
in political contributions and reduces transaction costs related to soliciting funding 
from individual farmers. In an environment with numerous small and medium-sized 
farmers, these problems and costs are likely to be large.
Indeed, we have evidence that in the past mills directly collected funds from 
farmers for political party coffers. Baviskar (1980) notes
kisan [a cooperative mill] has made substantial contributions to congress 
funds. In one year, the factory collected for the party 25 paise per tonne 
of cane supplied by its shareholders. Thus, in a single year more than 
rs 50,000 was collected. Although this contribution was voluntary in the-
ory, in practice most shareholders were pressurized to contribute. This 
method of collecting party funds was followed in other co-operatives too 
and leaders were able to collect over rs 1,50,000 for the Taluka congress 
committee in a very short time.
I am unable to find any evidence of such direct contributions in recent times. In 
any case, the institutional arrangement may make it possible for politicians to make 
commitments to farmers to pay back ex post rather than inflating prices ex ante. 
Table 6—Pay Back from Party
Cane price Recovery rate Mill closed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Affiliated party rules State 22.72**  22.91*** 0.0966*  0.0985* 0.00743 0.00862
(10.36) (8.619) (0.0558) (0.0551) (0.0193)  (0.0194)
Affiliated party rules Nation −11.17 −9.740 −0.0687 −0.0784* 0.0184 0.0145
(9.630) (9.100)  (0.0563)  (0.0473) (0.0194) (0.0185)
Mill fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall, capacity No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,151 1,151 1,413 1,413 1,874 1,874
Adj r2 0.86 0.87 0.73 0.75 0.44 0.47
notes: The table reports coefficients from estimations of equation (5) with mill outcomes as dependent variables. 
Standard errors are multi-way clustered by year-region and mill.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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There are limits to re-matching between mills and chairmen. Chairmen-politicians 
cannot suddenly move to a different constituency to contest elections. Knowing 
that politicians are tied to the mill, farmers might be willing to accept election-year 
losses. The repeated interaction of politicians and farmers might form the basis of a 
reciprocal relationship.
Farmers must have a reasonable expectation that they will benefit from their sup-
port of politician-chairmen. While I do not have the data available to do a careful 
calculation of benefits net of costs, I can perform a rough calculation to see whether 
farmers make a reasonable return on their “investment.” I assume that the probabil-
ity of winning a national election conditional on contesting is one-third, equal to the 
lowest proportion of contesting candidates who won in my sample. From Table 5, I 
note that prices were Rs 80 higher than normal in the year after elections in winning 
mills. Thus, farmers can expect to receive about Rs 27 on their principal of Rs 20 
(the election year drop in mills with contesting chairmen), a real rate of return of 35 
percent. Given the average amount of cane crushed, in expectation a farmer gains 
about $40 per election.30
V. Conclusion
This paper examines an agricultural commodity market and finds evidence of elec-
toral cycles in outcomes of sugar mills in Maharashtra. In particular, the cane price 
falls by approximately Rs 20 in politically controlled mills during election years. 
These drops translate to an economically significant drop in revenues of Rs. 6 million 
(US $135,000) per election year per mill. Evidence suggests that the profit decline is 
not due to effects on mill operations, but rather due to appropriation of funds for elec-
toral purposes. These results supplement previous literature on political cycles, which 
has focused on the spending rather than the raising of campaign finance.
From the perspective of farmers, this fall in prices could represent either pure theft 
by mill chairmen, or indirect campaign contributions. Given that it is unlikely that 
farmer-shareholders are completely ignorant of stealing and electoral cycles, and 
that internal mill elections are competitive, the latter interpretation seems plausible. 
Testing for whether farmers receive anything in return, I find that chairmen who win 
national elections pay higher cane prices in the year after elections. Moreover, when 
the party affiliated with the mill’s chairman is in power at the state level, the mill also 
pays higher cane prices. This set of results must be interpreted with caution, however, 
as they offer only one possible explanation for why price manipulation may continue.
The overall effect on farmer welfare is difficult to determine. On average, cane 
prices and recovery rates in politically connected mills are no different than those 
in nonpolitically connected mills, and the levels of public goods are no different 
either. Nonetheless, it is possible that there are costs and benefits not captured in 
the outcomes that I consider. Even more difficult to measure are the overall costs 
30 On the other hand, there are no observable differences in the availability of public goods in villages near (within 
a 15 km radius) politically connected versus nonpolitically connected mills. These average figures do not preclude the 
possibility that the money siphoned off from cane prices in election years is spent on public goods but that such spend-
ing on public goods falls dramatically in nonelection years. Such a scenario seems unlikely, however, at least for the 
kinds of goods (schools, health centers, etc) in the data. Results available on request.
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or benefits to society; the diversion of state funds by the politically powerful to 
their favored sugar mills may have associated welfare costs (see, for example, 
Khwaja and Mian 2005).
Complementing the previous literature on political connections and political 
cycles, this paper finds that politicians extract rents from firms in order to further 
their personal electoral goals. The paper also disentangles the costs and benefits of 
political connections across time, and suggests that studies of political connections 
should incorporate a longer time horizon in order to capture periods when connected 
politicians require financing for their own aims.
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